Malicious JavaScript injected through an unauthorized breach of Optimizely Web Experimentation turned some of the world’s most visited websites into vectors for silent cryptocurrency theft and credential skimming. Security researchers at Report URI uncovered the campaign—dubbed "OPTIMJACK" by independent security analyst Amirul Iman—after detecting hostile code embedded across 188 JavaScript snippets deployed by 178 global enterprises. The victims included household institutions such as Zoom, the BBC, CNN, HSBC, Salesforce, Equifax, IKEA, and hardware cryptocurrency wallet manufacturer Ledger.
The attack unfolded when an adversary exploited an authentication vulnerability within Optimizely’s customer onboarding infrastructure. The breach granted the attacker write access to the Project JavaScript configuration field across hundreds of independent, multi-tenant corporate accounts. Because enterprise clients embed Optimizely’s dynamic scripts directly into their web pages to conduct A/B testing and user experience personalization, browsers worldwide downloaded and executed the malicious instructions under the trusted origin of Optimizely’s official content delivery network (CDN).
Scott Helme, founder of Report URI and the researcher who spearheaded the initial investigation, estimated that the tampered scripts were served across roughly 34 million visitor sessions, with potential exposure ranging from 6 million to 150 million page loads.
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OPTIMJACK ATTACK LIFECYCLE |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1. Attacker exploits vulnerability in Optimizely account signup flow |
| │ |
| ▼ |
| 2. Cross-tenant write access gained to customer "Project JavaScript" |
| │ |
| ▼ |
| 3. Malicious loaders written into 188 project snippets across 178 orgs |
| │ |
| ▼ |
| 4. cdn.optimizely.com serves tampered scripts under valid TLS certificates |
| │ |
| ▼ |
| 5. Execution in client browser: |
| ├── Multi-Chain Crypto Address Clipper (DOM & Clipboard Hijacking) |
| ├── Payment Card Skimmer (Formjacking via sendBeacon to card.php) |
| ├── Session & Screen Exfiltration (html2canvas to hit.php) |
| └── Targeted iOS Redirection (Coruna/DarkSword exploit kits via .icu) |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
The script executed four distinct, hostile operations inside the user's browser:
- It hijacked the operating system clipboard and modified the Document Object Model (DOM) to replace cryptocurrency deposit addresses with attacker-controlled wallets.
- It monitored web forms to harvest payment card details, exfiltrating Luhn-validated card numbers, expiration dates, and CVVs.
- It collected session cookies and utilized the html2canvas library to capture silent screenshots of user activity.
- It fingerprinted mobile visitors running Apple iOS, routing devices on older software versions toward specialized exploit kits.
Optimizely confirmed the intrusion, stating that the unauthorized party had been contained, the entry vector blocked, and the malicious code purged from customer snippets. Salesforce confirmed it disabled Optimizely scripts across preview and production environments as a precaution. Equifax permanently ceased its use of the platform after completing an internal probe.
While the incident was mitigated within approximately 19 hours, it exposed a structural vulnerability in web security: the absolute trust modern web architectures grant to dynamic, third-party software vendors.
The Problem Defined: Client-Side Crypto Wallet Hacking at Enterprise Scale
The OPTIMJACK campaign highlights a dangerous shift in the mechanics of digital asset theft. Historically, crypto wallet hacking required adversaries to crack cryptographic private keys, deploy custom infostealer binaries directly onto local operating systems, or trick victims through deceptive phishing domains that masqueraded as legitimate decentralized applications. The Optimizely breach bypassed every single one of those traditional requirements.
By poisoning the web supply chain, the attackers did not need to penetrate user devices, steal private recovery phrases, or compromise the underlying blockchain protocols. Instead, they manipulated the browser execution context at the exact moment transactions were generated. When users copy and paste cryptographic addresses, or view dynamic payment addresses generated on legitimate corporate platforms, they inherently trust that what is rendered on screen matches the intended recipient. The injection invalidated that core assumption.
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CLIENT-SIDE EXECUTION HIJACKING |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| User copies destination address: |
| [ 0x71C...8472 ] |
| |
| Malicious JavaScript intercepts event: |
| document.addEventListener('copy', (e) => { ... }) |
| |
| Clipboard data overwritten in background: |
| [ 0x168...360A ] <-- Attacker Wallet Address |
| |
| User pastes into external wallet & signs transfer: |
| FUNDS IRREVERSIBLY BROADCAST TO BLOCKCHAIN LEDGER |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
Modern websites rely extensively on client-side scripts to deliver rich interactive experiences. Digital marketing, user interface testing, analytics monitoring, customer feedback widgets, and payment handling routinely operate via third-party code pulled from external content delivery networks.
Web browsers enforce the Same-Origin Policy (SOP) to isolate resources across different domains. However, when an enterprise includes a remote script via a standard HTML